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PUBLICITY AND THE JUDICIAL POWER
Daniel N. Hoffman*
Imagine a governmental body whose function is to decide,
case by case, which of two competitors coming before it shall
receive a certain benefit. Imagine further that the body's
standard procedure is to flip a coin and then announce, "Heads;
this one wins," or "Tails; that one wins."
Based on this description, we can make at least one
statement with complete confidence: The body is not an
American Article III court. The Constitution grants to the federal
courts "jurisdiction" over certain kinds of cases or controversies
(itemized by subject matter and parties). "Jurisdiction," it would
seem, literally refers to the power to declare or expound (dictio)
the law (juris). The body in question here, however, can do
nothing of the sort.
Some may reply that the essence of the judicial power is
not to declare law but to dispose of cases. Dictio, they may note,
can also be translated as "to administer." However, the Romans
and their continental successors did not enjoy a separation of
powers like ours. Under our Constitution, the choice between
common law and continental theories of adjudication is not
ambiguous but clear. A "case or controversy" as we know it
requires not only proper parties with concrete stakes in the
outcome, but also real judging. If all a "court" did was to flip
coins and dispose of cases by declaring "P wins" or "D wins,"
it would not be acting judicially in the Article III sense. The
court would neither be reasoning with us nor relying on
identified statutes or judicial precedents. Only its purported
authority to issue orders could support the decision. But in a
constitutional republic, on what can the authority of unelected
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judges rest? Simply on that of those who appointed them? Then

how could we call this an "independent" judiciary?
A rule mandating a coin-tossing practice-or, I submit,
even one simply forbidding the giving of reasons, and thus
defining justice as whatever a court says it is-would violate our
shared understanding of what the rule of law means. In
comparative law, we called it Qadi justice, something different
in kind from law as we know it.
The decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Anastasoff' invalidated a judicial practice quite different from
that described above. Nevertheless, the court's ruling rested on
an understanding of the judicial power close to that advanced
here. The case is unusual in two respects: first, as a holding by
(a panel of) an appellate court that one of the court's own
procedural rules is unconstitutional; second, in its reliance not
on a right of litigants, but on Article III's conception of the
judicial power itself.
While the ground of decision marks this a separation of
powers case, most court decisions interpreting the doctrine of
separated powers are quite different, in that they pertain to the
outer limits of a branch's power, to the points beyond which its
action will invade the prerogatives or usurp the functions
granted to another branch. In Anastasoff, however, we deal with
the question of inherent limits to a branch's power: the points at
which its action simply cannot be recognized as proper to or
competent for the branch it is.
There is very little black-letter law on issues of inherent
powers, for several reasons. First, the constitutional text is very
reticent about the meaning of the terms "legislative,"
"executive," and "judicial," treating them either as self-evident
or as adequately specified by the particular powers granted to
each branch. Moreover, the Constitution arguably (and, in the
case of Congress, explicitly) leaves to each branch a good deal
of discretion with regard to its internal decisionmaking
procedures. Second, such questions do not frequently arise, and
even less often in a justiciable context. A court is

1. Anastasoff v. U.S., 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054
(8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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understandably reluctant to declare that an act of another branch
was outside the scope of that branch's powers.
There have, of course, been a few celebrated inherent
powers cases all the same. Quite unlike Anastasoff, most are
cases where a newly asserted power, not expressly granted by
the Constitution, is claimed to be inherent in a branch's
functions because it is essential to its ability to perform those
successfully. 2 Rarer still, but more closely on point, are cases
such as the delegation doctrine and legislative veto decisions,
holding that a branch is, by its inherent nature, disabled from
engaging in a certain action or practice.3 One might call this the
doctrine of inherent disabilities.
It is usually easier in terms of comity for a court to declare
a limitation on its own power than to declare one on the powers
of the other branches. Yet even a ruling of this type may be
deemed aggressive and usurpatory by other branches; the classic
example was Marbury.5 The courts have also declined on other
occasions to behave in ways they regarded as nonjudicial; e.g.,
refusing to give advisory opinions and refusing to issue
decisions that are reviewable and reversible by executive
officers.6 Anastasoff falls squarely within this line of cases
except for the fact that the rule at issue here was made by the
court itself. Yet from the perspective of inherent powers and
inherent disabilities, this is clearly an irrelevant distinction.
Strong judicial resistance would be expected if another branch
2. See e.g. U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (executive agreements); McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (congressional investigations); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564
(1895) (presidential order maintenance); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505 (1873) (judicial
contempt power).
3. See e.g. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (legislative veto); Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (lack of inherent presidential power); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (delegation of congressional powers).
4. Additional arguments of this tenor are possible, though not well supported by
precedent. For example, one could argue that, because legislation is inherently general in
scope, infra n. II and accompanying text, private bills are not proper legislative acts. Cf
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (less stringent review for "laws of general
application"); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). One could also
argue that certain executive orders and actions constitute making law, not executing it.
5. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
6. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792); Letter of Chief Justice Jay and Associate
Justices to President Washington, in John Jay, The Correspondence and Public Papers of
John Jay vol. III, 487-88 (Henry P. Johnston ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1890) (advisory
opinions).
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forbade them to explain themselves, but the issue pertains more
to the impact of the rule than to its source.
The phenomenon at the root of the problem in Anastasoff is
that for about thirty years, the federal courts of appeals have
been struggling to accommodate their decisionmaking practices
to an exponential growth in the quantity of law, unmatched by
commensurate growth in the size and staffing resources of the
judiciary. Some observers see this growth as threatening to
completely overwhelm the judiciary's ability to decide cases
efficiently. Responsive innovations in the various circuits have
included, among other things, dispensing with oral argument,
summary decisions without opinion, and opinions prepared on a
"not for publication" basis. In connection with the last of these
practices, many circuits have provided in addition that an
"unpublished" opinion may not be cited, or, in the Eighth
Circuit's more qualified language, is "not precedent and parties
generally should not cite [it]," unless a decision has "persuasive
value" and there is no equivalent published opinion.7
While some objections to these innovations question the
validity of their pragmatic rationale,' objections in principle

7. 8th Cir. R. 28A(i) (West Group 2000).
8. Since I first looked twenty years ago at the issues concerning nonpublication of
appellate court opinions, see Daniel Hoffman, Nonpublicationof FederalAppellate Court
Opinions, 6 Justice System J. 405 (1981), much has been written and the relevant
guidelines and practices have evolved. Still, the main questions I raised at that time are
very pertinent: How substantial are the measurable benefits and costs, respectively, of these
practices? How persuasive is the argument that, even if the benefits exceed the costs, the
practices are nevertheless unacceptable in principle?
On the empirical questions there may be relatively little new to say. Whatever
common sense may suggest, I demonstrated that, as of 1980, no substantial benefit was
evident from the available statistics. Review of subsequent literature indicates that no one
has yet assumed the burden of demonstrating such a benefit. While the circuits still vary
greatly in the proportion of dispositions accompanied by published opinions, as well as in
the overall speed of dispositions, and while many of the circuits have significantly changed
one or both of those dimensions, no clear-cut correlation between the two statistics has yet
been shown, either for circuits or for individual judges. The ostensible benefits in terms of
judicial efficiency remain merely that-ostensible. That the new practices are positively
indispensable is a completely ungrounded empirical claim. Meanwhile, a number of studies
have supplied additional reports of abuses and further evidence that the formal guidelines
do not in fact guide judicial decisions and do not ensure that significant lawmaking
precedents will be published. See e.g. Donald R. Songer, Danna Smith & Reginald S.
Sheehan, Nonpublication in the Eleventh Circuit: An Empirical Analysis, 16 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. 963 (1989); Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 L. &
Contemp. Probs. 157 (1998).
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were also quick to surface, and some were couched in
constitutional terms. Different critics have deployed First
Amendment (right to petition), Due Process (fair hearing), and
Equal Protection arguments to establish that litigants and
attorneys are entitled to have full and equal access to the law and
to inform the court of precedents they deem helpful to their
cases, unobstructed by judicial resort to unexplained judgments
or by unpublished or noncitable opinions. While I find much
merit in these arguments, I shall not delve into them here, since
Anastasoff rests directly on the interpretation of Article li. 9
Are these new, efficiency-driven court procedures
consistent with Article III? One important way to expound on
the meaning of "judicial power" or "jurisdiction" is to revisit
the fundamental reason we have a separate judicial branch in the
first place: the concept of the rule of law. To combine the
judicial with the legislative or the executive power, says Publius,
is the essence of tyranny. ' 0 The laws must be general in their
language and effect, say Locke and other theorists."' Laws
require application and interpretation; that the state of nature
lacks impartial arbiters for this purpose is one of the major
reasons to establish a government. Hence the most essential
attribute of the judicial process and the most essential aspect of
"good behavior" for a judge is neutrality. Because judges are
human and have their own personal/partisan interests and
preferences, they contribute to the legitimacy of the state only if
their judgments are rendered not according to the judge's
personal will, but according to law. That the decision is made
according to law, moreover, must be demonstrable-not taken
on faith.
Judicial independence and neutrality are the fundamental
motivations for Article III. Practices that undermine these
virtues, whether externally or internally imposed, are at the least
9. Some of the arguments are adumbrated in the articles cited supra n. 8; others were
sketched in recent discussions, prompted by Anastasoff, on a listserv to which the author
subscribes.
10. No. 47: Madison, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, & John Jay, The
Federalist Papers 300-308 (Clinton Rossiter ed., Penguin Group 1961).
11. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government and a Letter Concerning
Toleration, ch. 11, $ 134f (J.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1947); Jean Jacques Rousseau,
The Social Contract and Discourses, Book 11, ch. VI, 69-75 (G.D.H. Cole trans., E.P.
Dutton & Co. 1950).
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in tension with that Article. "No one shall judge his own
cause": The "judgment" of an admittedly partial judge would
be no judgment at all, and it would be the clear duty of a higher
court to vacate it. And the "judgment" of a judge who made no
analysis of the case, but only flipped a coin? Likewise. And the
"judgment" of a judge who declares, "I have reasons, but I
won't tell them to you?" Or how about, "Here are my reasons,
and don't cite me any contradictory precedents, or I'll hold you
in contempt?" Or, finally, "Here are my reasons, but this
judgment is not precedential and may not be cited in the
future?" While these cases are not identical, they are troubling
in closely related ways.
If the lower court has simply given no reasons, an appellate
court can remand the case for that purpose; but, if the law is
sufficiently clear to the appellate court, it may not need to do so.
A court of final decision, however, because it has the last word,
must provide that word in order to incorporate the case into the
body of law. A nonprecedential decision, because it will not be
so incorporated, is not law.
Given the dearth of black-letter law, it would be no great
surprise if some readers of this essay said, "But that's a policy
argument-not a constitutional argument." These readers,
whose objection relies on an understanding of the difference
between law and politics, must think they can recognize when
law runs out. Hence, they should be the first to demand a
constitutionally adequate explanation for every judicial act-an
explanation that takes that act from the realm of will into the
realm of law.
We know we are in the presence of law not by the building,
the robes, or the library, but by the reasons given and the
discourse of which those reasons are a part. To say that no
reason-no debatable reason-is needed, is to cease to say what
the law is.
"It is emphatically the power and the duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is." 12 In making declarations that
lack precedential authority ab initio-whatever the exact scope

12. Marbury v. Madison, 4 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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of that authority may be when actually exercised-judges are
not acting judicially. 3
Law is inherently a matter
of public record, available to all
it.' 4
know
to
need
or
wish
who
Hence the non-citation rule violates Article III.
At the heart of every constitutional problem involving the
role and powers of the judiciary is the distinction between law
and politics.'5 The judiciary exists to provide a good-the rule of
law-that politics itself cannot provide, because to permit the
"political branches" to interpret the laws would create a
potential for tyranny. For this design to be viable, courts must be
seen as apolitical.
This reasoning entails the need for a constitutional doctrine
of the law/politics distinction: not only do courts not decide
questions in their nature political,' 6 nor succumb to interference
with their independence by the political branches; neither do
they use methods of deciding that are in their nature inherently
nonlegal.
A political decision is often an act of will or, as Sunstein
puts it, "naked preference." A legal decision, in contrast, is an
elaboration/application of principles (or of precedents which
articulated those principles). So, to be manifestly a decision
according to law, a judicial decision must, at a minimum,
identify the principles/precedents on which it is based. In the
case of judicial decisions, in other words, we must know not
only who won, but also what the reasons were.
This is not true in the same sense for legislative and
executive decisions. We indeed have a clear right to know just
what we are commanded to do. Voters and lobbyists may indeed
petition for explanations, and hold officials politically
accountable if not satisfied. But we cannot say that an
unexplained law or executive order is null and void. The
absence of reasons often becomes most troublesome precisely
when a court is asked to interpret the law or order and finds that
'"

13. Cf Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792).
14. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale U. Press 1964).
15. This topic is a major focus of Daniel N. Hoffman, Our Elusive Constitution:
Silences, Paradoxes,Priorities(SUNY Press 1997).
16. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. I (1849); Marbury, 4 U.S. at 177.
17. Cass R. Sunstein, The PartialConstitution 25 (Harvard U. Press 1993).
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silence a hindrance. Occasionally, a court may even weigh the
absence of legislative "findings"
against the law's
constitutionality.18 But courts have never imposed a formal
requirement that the legislature state reasons. Elected officials
may take emergency actions of dubious legality and "throw
themselves on their country" for political vindication.' 9 Courts
tend to abstain from such cases, or find that the action was
ultimately ratified by political means.20
In contrast, judicial requirements that administrative orders
be supported by reasons are common.2 ' Quite aware that these
requirements greatly facilitate judicial review, courts are not
deterred by separation of powers concerns from imposing them
on subordinate executive agencies. Yet here the common
justification is certainly not the inherent requirements of Article
II. It is either the due process right of the litigant or the Article
III imperative of the court itself.
One major difference between the branches is that, at least
in theory, the sovereign people have opportunity to ascertain,
judge, and correct, by interest articulation and voting, what the
legislature and the chief executive have done. Court decisions
are not corrigible in the same sense, though by more arduous,
indirect routes they may be. In the particular case of an
unexplained judgment, we can determine only who won--but
what are we to do then? Seek to amend the statutes involved in
the case? But how? Seek to impeach the judge? But on what
ground?
Law is by nature a public thing: res publica. In researching
issues of governmental secrecy years ago, discovering a State
Department memorandum titled "Secret Statutes of the United
States"" came as a shock. How could there be such laws? The
memorandum dated from the post-World War I period, and the
motive for its production never became clear. The secret statutes
reported were from the pre-War of 1812 era, and authorized

18. E.g. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
19. A.M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency 35 (Popular Library 1974) (quoting

a statement from Thomas Jefferson regarding the Louisiana Purchase).
20. E.g. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863). For more on judicial acquiescence in
presidential stretches of power, see Hoffman, supra n. 15.
21. E.g. Clay v. U.S., 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
22. D.H. Miller, Secret Statutes of the United States (USGPO 1918).
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President James Madison to occupy Spanish West Florida
without a public declaration of war. This unsavory episode-a
day that lives in infamy?--does little to enhance the reputation
of the Father of our Constitution. Even if one thought there
might be cases where the president, with his responsibilities for
national security, must and may act in secret, the executive
ought not to involve the other branches in such nefarious
action. 23 Neither the legislature nor the courts can properly do
this. The capacity and penchant of the executive for secrecy is
precisely what makes it the most dangerous branch.24 When
Congress closes its doors, it is still a legislature, but its work
product is not law until it is available to the public. Nor, in
general, is that of a court.25
"Available to the public" is an ambiguous phrase. What is
the teaching of history here? Does the fact that a given sort of
publicity was not practiced-indeed was impossible-two
hundred years ago mean that it cannot be mandatory now that it
is possible? How specific is the standard implicit in Article III?
Anastasoff explains that, before the era of widespread
publication, "the record of the judicial proceedings and decision
alone" 26 or "decisions... established only by memory or by a
lawyer's unpublished memorandum" 2 7 or " [a] manuscript
note ' ' 28 could be and were used as precedents when nothing
better was available. Judging from the use in early congressional
debates of similarly ill-documented legislative, executive, and
judicial "precedents," 29 this contemporary judicial practice must
have been equally fraught with confusion, unfairness, and
potential deceit.
Is there then a clear-cut constitutional rule as to judicial
publicity? There is, of course, a right to a public trial.3 ° As for
appeals, Anastasoff argues simply that, although publication of
23. Cf Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
24. See generally Daniel N. Hoffman, Governmental Secrecy and the Founding
Fathers: A Study in Constitutional Controls (Greenwood Press 198 1).
25. Of course, a procedural step such as issuing a warrant is quite different from the
final disposition of a case.
26. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 901 n. 9 (citing Blackstone).
27. Id. at 903.
28. Id. at 903 n. 14.
29. See supra n. 25.
30 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
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opinions was neither mandatory nor standard practice in the
Founding period, court decisions, published or not, were viewed
as inherently precedential. The holding, accordingly, is not that
publication is required, but that unpublished decisions are as
precedential and as binding as published ones. "Binding" is not
fully elaborated, but according to Eighth Circuit practice, only
the court en banc has authority to overrule a circuit precedent. A
full theory of "bindingness" is not necessary to deal with the
extreme case of ipso facto nonprecedentiality.
A reference to the alternative practice of issuing summary
dispositions with no opinion at all-a practice which some think
the rule of Anastasoff would increase-suggests that the court
did not go far enough. To hold the legislature or executive
accountable, it may be sufficient to describe what they did and
assess the consequences-without necessarily having to know
the motivation. If a law harms me, I am entitled to try to change
it, regardless of the reasons behind its passage. But there is an
important sense in which judicial decisions cannot be evaluated
without regard to the reasoning behind them-precisely because
they stand not just as ad hoc orders but as precedents, to be
judged by rule-oriented and not act-oriented standards. Courtsespecially appellate courts-must give reasons.
If a court decision is announced as nonprecedential or
simply unexplained, there can scarcely be any remedy except for
appeal to a higher court. It is true that unpublished decisions
can, in principle, be appealed; certiorari has on occasion been
granted, and reversals do occur.' On one occasion, the Supreme
Court noted its consternation that a court of appeals decision
affirming the invalidation of a federal statute had not been
published.32 But even if it is not absolutely decisive, the
"nonprecedential" label cannot but burden an appellant's
prospects for success in the appeal. Likewise, making an
important decision noncitable burdens the prospects of litigants
in future cases. Perhaps there is a First Amendment right to
discuss these in the press and argue their legal relevance in that
forum, but that is not the forum in which the law is supposed to
work itself clean.
31. E.g. Hughes v.Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980); Browder v. Director,Dept. of Corrections
of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257 (1978); Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191 (1972).
32. U.S. v. Edge Broad., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
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How much must we be told to enable us to understand what
the law is, according to which the conflict has been resolved?
"Affirmed in light of the precedent, P v. D" might conceivably
suffice. But "Affirmed, Rule 51" cannot suffice, because rule
51, which simply permits summary dispositions, is not a rule of
substantive law. It does not even pretend to explain why this
plaintiff, or those similarly situated, are entitled to prevail. At
most, it suggests that the court has deliberated and, for unknown
reasons, has determined that such is the case.
To apprehend the decision as founded in or supported by
law, one must either have reasons or fall back on blind faith.
Suppose we require a statement of reasons. How far are we to
go? The extreme would be a Herculean requirement 33 that the

court demonstrate not only that the decision is supported by
some law, but that it is coherent with the seamless web-with all
the law there is. Here, as the law exponentially grows in
quantity, the task of the courts would indeed become impossible,
at least unless they could rely on a presumption that the few
authorities they do cite are in turn consistent with all the law
there is.
Nonsense upon stilts? It is hard to see how we could ever
have total confidence in the law's coherence. But one thing is
certain: The freedom of litigants to call to our attention and to
the courts' attention any precedents and principles they deem
inconsistent with the result advocated by the other side is a
necessary condition for having the confidence we need.
Otherwise there is no sufficient check, scrutiny, or
accountability.
There is, in the final analysis, a profound contradiction
between the discursive logic of the rule of law and the
authoritarian logic of bureaucratic efficiency. Moreover, this is
not-cannot be-one of the many tensions our Constitution
a
accepts as unavoidable and tries to negotiate.
3 4

33. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Belknap Press 1986).
34. Cf supra n. 17.
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To do so would end by reducing popular sovereignty to a
symbolic embellishment of law's violence." This would be a
radically different Constitution from the one we thought we had.

35. Cf Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword. Nomos and
Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983).

